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Abstract 
This study develops a game-theoretic framework to examine the 
preservation and capitalization effects of government farmland 
preservation policies.  More specifically, emphasis is given to the effects of 
such policies on the number and type of land buyers, the distribution of 
offer price, and the mean waiting period.  The results suggest that, in the 
context of the agricultural zoning policy, the final impact on the 
reservation price and mean waiting period depends on the magnitude of 
changes in the number and spread of the type of buyers. 
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1. Introduction 
The question of how offer prices are formed for commodities with public 
goods characteristics remains to be a salient issue in the public goods 
literature because the market fails to determine the optimal allocation of 
such goods.  Farmland is one such commodity with its spatial fixity, 
durability, and heterogeneity (Xu, et al., 1993), and hence the market fails 
to provide its optimal allocation as well. The reasons are threefold. First, 
spatial fixity makes it hard to protect the land against adverse external 
effects, calling for government intervention to avoid or reduce these 
effects. Second, land quality is influenced by its degree of  durability, 
irreversibility, and renewability. Land is durable in the physical sense, 
however, its desirable attributes may be lost over time at a large scale 
unless necessary measures are taken by policy makers to preserve them.1 
Third, heterogeneity limits the number and type of agents in the land 
market,  invalidating the neoclassical assumption that agents are price-
takers. 
Considering these special features of land, we seek in this study to present 
a hedonic price approach to modeling the private-valuation and formation 
of the offer price of land.  Our modeling is based on the notion that land is 
heterogeneous in its attributes, and that the private-valuation of the 
                                                 
1 The reader is referred to Henneberry and Barrow (1990) and Beaton (1991) for the price 
effect of government interventions in farmland markets. 
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attributes is the only factor that determines the offer price (e.g., Xu, et al., 
1993; Palmquist, 1989).  More specifically, we assume that an individual's 
valuation of a parcel of land depends on the attributes of the parcel  
whose hedonic prices are determined only by the individual's preferences. 
To simplify the analysis, we further assume that hedonic prices and 
therefore individual valuations of land are independent across 
individuals. 
Applying a search model in which farmers are treated as sellers in the 
farmland market, Tavernier and Li (1995) showed that government 
programs increasing current farm income should result in an increase in 
the reservation price, and hence lead to some degree of farmland 
preservation. Unfortunately, their approach suffers two weaknesses: first, 
buyers are treated as passive agents; and second, the distribution of their 
offer price is assumed to be exogenously given (Stern, 1990). In the present 
study, we try to overcome these weaknesses by modeling farmers as 
buyers and assuming that they have subjective beliefs about the 
distribution of offer prices (McCall, 1970). 
In the next section we develop a bidding game to illustrate the formation 
of the offer price, using the concept of hedonic prices. Private information 
plays an important role in this price formation process, which is modeled 
as a Bayesian game.  The offer price is based on the subjective belief of 
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buyers with regard to the underlying value of farmland and the strategic 
behavior of others in the farmland market. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 introduces the hedonic 
price approach for the private valuation of farmland.  A symmetric 
equilibrium solution for this game is derived in Section 3.  In Section 4, the 
properties of such equilibrium are investigated.  Section 5 concludes,  
drawing attention to the implications of the results for designing farmland 
preservation policies.  
2. Private Information and Valuation of Land 
A first-price bidding game, also known as a first-price sealed-bid auction, 
was developed by Rasmusen (1989).  The Bayesian equilibrium concept is 
utilized in our framework as players have incomplete information (see 
Harsanyi, 1967-68).  In this game, there are many potential buyers who 
simultaneously make offers to the seller of land.  The seller accepts the 
highest bid that exceeds his reservation price. 
Following Rosen (1974), nature selects a vector of land attributes, x, (x∈X), 
such as lot size, distance from the city, and the variables related to the 
quality of land.  An (m x 1) vector of the values of attributes is assumed to 
be in a hedonic price space.  These values are common knowledge, while 
each player has her/his own valuation about the common value of x 
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drawn from a single underlying distribution.  The value of land that buyer 
i assigns, ti, is derived from his profit (utility) maximization problem,  
(1)   ti = hi(x;αi),  
where hi is buyer i's hedonic price rule, ti is a positive real-valued random 
variable.  Given the vector of attributes x, buyer i's subjective valuation of 
a land parcel, ti, only depends on his hedonic prices for x, αi.  αi is a (1 x 
m) hedonic price vector assumed to be private information.  The pricing 
rule hi(.) represents the subjective valuation of the land.  For simplicity, we 
assume one's valuation is independent of others and hi(.) is symmetric 
across all players; that is, hi(.)≡h(x;αi) ∀i.  (Notice that the rule itself is 
invariant across buyers but the hedonic price vector of attributes.)    It is 
important to note that hedonic prices embody both public and private 
information on attributes. We assume that the impact of public and 
private information on the hedonic prices is independent of  each other. 
The game is described as follows.  There are n players (who are potential 
buyers) indexed by i∈N={1,2,...,n}. Given x, player (buyer) i forms his/her 
maximum offer price ti that belongs to a complete, separable metric space, 
Ti, where T = X x T1 x...x Tn.  Then, he/she selects an offer price ai∈Ai 
where Ai is a compact metric space and A = A1 x A2...x An.  Player i's 
payoff function, Ui, assumed to be a bounded and measurable function 
from T x A to R (R is the set of real numbers) is of the form, 
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            if    a   
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Suppose a vector α≡(α1,...,αn)  is drawn from an i.i.d. distribution which is 
common knowledge.  Let f(x,t) be the joint probability density function of 
the random variables t≡(t1, ..., tn).  Assuming that the vector of conditional 
density functions g(./x)≡(g(t1/x) ... g(tn/x)) and marginal density e(x) are 
derived from f(t,x) implies f(x,t)=e(x) g(./x).  The functions f(x,t) and g(./x) 
are also common knowledge. 
Given x, the players are ordered by their maximum offer prices.  From 
buyer i's point of view, let y be the highest offer price of the (n-1) players, 
that is, y≥yj for all j≠i.  Then the conditional probability that this event 
occurs is, 
(3) k(y/x) = (n-1) g(y/x) [Prob(y≥yj for all j≠i)]=(n-1) g(y/x) (y/x)n-2 
where G(./x) =(y/x) is the cdf of g(./x) and g(0/x)= G(0/x) = 0. 
3. The symmetric equilibrium 
A pure strategy is a measurable function, σi: Ti → Ai, that is, ai=σi(ti) for 
all i.  Knowing ti and x, player i offers a price, ai, for the land on sale.  We 
can write ai=σ(ti) for all i since the price rule is the same across players.  
Player i will treat the highest offer y of others as a random variable.  His 
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strategy yi is the best response to y if it maximizes the expected payoff (for 
further discussion of the bid game, see chapter 11 of Rasmusen, 1989; 
Milgrom and Weber, 1982).  Following equation (2), we write  
(4)   a t t a ti i
a
i i t a i
i j i
= = −
<
σ
σ
*
{ ( ) }( ) arg max[( ) | ]* . 
An n-tuple of offer prices, (a1, ..., an), is an equilibrium if each offer price is 
a best response to that of others.  The best response of player i is obtained 
from maximizing the following expected payoff function with respect to ai 
EU t a f y x t dyi i i
t
ii= −∫ ( ) ( / , )0  = −∫
−
−( ) [ ( / )]( ) t a d G y xi ia ni0 1
1σ  
where f(y/x,t) = k(y/x) due to the assumption of i.i.d.  The inverse of the 
measurable function is denoted by ti = σi-1(ai).  The first order condition 
(FOC) for a maximum expected payoff is  
0 1 2
1
1
0= − − − ∫
−
−
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 Applying the derivative rule of the inverse function to the FOC yields 
(5)   
∂
∂
a
t
g t x
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i
i
i
i i= − −
( / )
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The solution to the differential equation (5) has the following general 
form, 
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The initial condition, a(0) = 0, implies c = 0 and a t
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The n-tuple (a,...,a) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium where 
(6)   a t
G s x ds
G t x
nt
n
= −
∫ −
−
[ ( / )]
[ ( / )]
1
0
1  = σ
*( )t . 
This equation gives the equilibrium strategy, a, of buyer i with type t and 
his/her prior beliefs about other players' valuations, G(t/x).  The solution a 
may be interpreted as an average taken with respect to a conditional 
distribution, G(t)n-1. This interpretation indicates the relationship between 
the two random variables, a and t, for any distribution of t.  In particular, 
if t is uniformly distributed, a=t(n-1)/n will be uniformly distributed as 
well.  That implies that one will never offer his maximum valuation t (i.e., 
ti>ai for all i).  The buyer faces one kind of constraint:  he can exert 
benefits from this auction (incentive compatibility).  Individual rationality 
is automatically satisfied since participating in the auction is his choice.  
This result proves true that equilibrium strategy is an incentive 
compatible and individually rational outcome of the game.    
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4. Properties of Equilibrium   
The distribution of offer prices plays a crucial role in the formation of  the 
seller's reservation price.  The equilibrium offer price obtained in the 
previous section shows that the number of players and the distribution of 
t affect the distribution of the equilibrium offer price, a.  In this section we 
address how the number of buyers and the distribution of their hedonic 
land valuation, t, influence the distribution of offer prices and the seller's 
reservation price.  
Equation (6) is the symmetric Nash equilibrium that assumes that the 
distribution of the strategies across players is identical.  This equilibrium  
does not imply that the offer price of every player is identical because 
individual offer price is a function of his type.  The equilibrium price will 
be the highest offer price. Under a monotonic mapping from t to a, in 
equilibrium the land goes to the person who values it the most (see 
Rasmusen, 1989, p.251).   
Under the symmetry assumption, the expected profit and expected offer 
price of a bidder are derived as follows. Using ∂a/∂t>0 (from equation (5)) 
and t=σ-1(a), the unconditional distribution of a becomes 
Φ( ) ( ' ) ' ( ( ))a a da G aa= ∫ = −φ σ0 1 and φ σ
σ
σ
( ) ( )
' ( )
( ( ))
( )( ( ) )a
g t
t
G a
n a a
= =
− −
−
−
1
11
.  φ(a) and 
Φ(a) are unconditional pdf and cdf of a, respectively.  For a winner whose 
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bid is accepted, the joint pdf and cdf are respectively 
f a a a G a
n a a
n
n
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−
−
−
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The expected profit of winner i is, by definition, 
E t a G t dtdG tw i i
nt
ii( ) [ ( )] ( )− = ∫∫ −∞ 100  where (t - a)  is the payoff conditional 
on winning (i.e., ai>aj for all j) and [G(t/x)]n-1 is the probability of winning.  
Furthermore, the mean value theorem gives 
(7)   E t a G t G t dt G b E tw
n n( ) [ ( )][ ( )] [ ( )] ( )− = −∫ =−∞ −1 10 1  
where 0 < b < ∞, E(t) is the unconditional expectation of t.  With the 
symmetry assumption, every player in the game expects to win with 
expected profit Ew(t-a).   Then, E t a E t a G t G t dtw
n( ) ( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]− = − = −∫ −∞ 10 1 .  
The expected offer price, E(a),  given by 
(8)  E t E t a G t G t dt G b E tn n( ) ( ) [ ( )]{ [ ( )] } [ [ ( )] ] ( )− − = − −∫ = −−∞ −1 1 110 1 .  
From the distribution of a, and using the definition of Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970), we get the mean-preserving spread of a as, 
v a a da n t a dG ta a( ) ( ' ) ' ( )( ) ( )( )= ∫ = − −∫
−
Φ0 0 1
1σ .  More clearly, it is equal to 
(9) 
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where 0 < c < a.  We now provide three propositions to illustrate the 
impact of the information structure on the distribution of the equilibrium 
offer price. 
Proposition 1: As the number of players in the game increases, E(a) and v(a)  
  will increase.  As n approaches infinity, E(a)=E(t), v(a)= v(t).   
Proof:  Since 0 < G(./x) < 1, as n increases, E(a) will increase according to 
equation (8).  Since 0 < c < a, 0 < G(c)/G(a) < 1, as n increases, v(a) will also 
increase according to equation (9).  As n approaches infinity, G(./x)n-1 and 
(G(c)/G(a))n-2 approaches zero.  Thus, E(t) = E(a), v(a) = v(t). 
Proposition 1 represents a convergence of the distribution of random 
variables in mean and spread: as the number of players in the game 
increases, seller's power in the auction increases and the probability that 
one can win the game with ti>ai decreases.  In other words, buyers' 
expected profit from this auction decreases and eventually the auction 
ends with ti=ai (Satterhwaite and Williams, 1989). 
Proposition 2:  Given x, as v(t) increases, v(a) also increase, and E(a) decreases. 
Proof:  From equation (9), as the mean-preserving spread of t increases, 
the spread of a also increases.  The proof of the second part of the 
proposition needs the definition of risk from Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1970).  We say G1(./x) is riskier than G2(./x) in terms of mean-preserving 
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spread, if, G t dt G t dts s10 20( ) ( )∫ ≥ ∫ , and tdG t tdG t10 20( ) ( )∞ ∞∫ = ∫ .   Let 
f t G s dsnt1 1
1
0( ) [ ( )]= ∫ − , then f(t) clearly is an increasing function.  From 
equation (7), we have E t a f t dG t1 1 10( ) ( ) ( )− = ∫∞  and 
E t a f t dG t2 2 20( ) ( ) ( )− = ∫∞  which imply  
E a E a f t dG t f t dG t f t dG t f t dG t2 1 1 10 2 20 1 10 1 20 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )− = ∫ − ∫ ≥ ∫ − ∫ =∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
. 
Proposition 2 implies that as the type of players becomes more diverse, 
the spread of the offer price increases and the mean offer price decreases.  
The final impact on the reservation price depends on the magnitude of the 
changes in the mean and mean-preserving spread.      
Proposition 3:  Given x, increasing E(t) leads to increasing E(a),  but v(a)    
                         remains indeterminate. 
Proof:  From (8), note that as E(t) increases, E(a) also increases.  From 
equation (9), however, one cannot determine the direction of change as 
E(t) increases.  Proposition 3 suggests that as the mean of the type of 
players increases, the mean offer price increases as well, but the impact on 
the spread is undetermined.  The final effect on the reservation price is 
positive if the change in mean is significant compared to the spread 
(Tavernier and Li 1995; Tavernier, Li, and Temel 1996).  Tavernier and Li 
(1995) show that the mean waiting period before land is sold is a function 
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of the reservation price and the distribution of the offer price.  The authors 
demonstrate that an increasing reservation price due to changes in the 
distribution of offer prices impacts the mean waiting period. 
5. Implications and Conclusion  
This study develops a game-theoretic framework to examine the 
formation of farmland offer prices. It is shown that both the number and 
the type of potential buyers in farmland markets are among important 
factors influencing the distribution of offer prices. Therefore, the impact of 
government interventions in the farmland markets on the number and 
type of buyers should be carefully investigated. 
In  the context of agricultural zoning, the type and number of potential 
buyers is decreased because developers and speculators are precluded 
from the farmland market.  According to the propositions derived above, 
as the number of buyers decrease, the mean E(a) and the spread of the  
offer price v(a) also decrease.  The final impact of agricultural zoning on 
reservation price and the mean waiting period depends on the degree of 
government interventions. This finding supports the conclusions of 
Henneberry and Barrows (1990), and Beaton (1991), and of studies that 
argue that the equity of farmers is negatively impacted by agricultural 
zoning (Nelson, 1988; Adelaja et al., 1989). 
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In the case of government housing subsidy, which increases the number of 
potential buyers in the farmland market, the results imply an increasing 
reservation price due to the increase in the mean offer price and the mean-
preserving spread.  Further findings suggest that as the spread of  the type 
of buyers v(t) increases, the mean of the offer price decreases, while the 
spread of the offer price increases. 
Our analysis points to some issues that might be of interest to policy 
makers.  In particular, the zoning of farmland has two potential "negative" 
effects.  First, zoning that restricts the number of buyers in the farmland 
markets depresses farmland price and at the same time provides an 
inadequate supply of land for housing. Thus, careful consideration must 
be given to policies to address the equity needs of farmers and the 
demand for affordable housing. 
With this study we introduced a game-theoretic model to investigate the 
effects of specific government policies on the farmland prices. The study 
makes an important contribution to the literature as it opens up an avenue 
for empirical studies to quantify the preservation and capitalization effects 
of government farmland preservation policy on land prices. 
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 Table 1.  Relationship between distribution of type and offer price. 
Distribution of the 
type of buyers  
Distribution of offer prices 
 
 
 MEAN [E(a)] STD [v(a)]  
MEAN [E(t)] + ?  
STD [v(t)] - +  
Number of buyers + +  
 
 
